Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2003

Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc., a Utah
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. Teton
Builders, a Wyoming corporation, and Thomas R.
Hunter, an individual, Defendants and Appellants :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen E. W. Hale, Jeffrey D. Stevens, Matthew J. Ball; Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless;
attorneys for appellee.
R. Stephen Marshall, Erik A. Olson; Durham, Jones, Pinegar; attorneys for appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Jacobsen Construction v. Teton Builders, No. 20030727.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2453

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Supreme Court No. 20030727-SC
TETON BUILDERS, a Wyoming
corporation, and THOMAS R. HUNTER,
an individual,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER, DISTRICT JUDGE

Stephen E. W. Hale
Jeffrey D. Stevens
Matthew J. Ball

R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Erik A. Olson (8479)

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN G E E &
LOVELESS

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000

185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee Jacobsen
Construction Company, Inc.

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

Attorneys for Appellants Teton Builders
and Thomas R. Hunter
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUN 25 200*1

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 20030727-SC

TETON BUILDERS, a Wyoming
corporation, and THOMAS R. HUNTER,
an individual,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER, DISTRICT JUDGE

Stephen E. W. Hale
Jeffrey D. Stevens
Matthew J. Ball

R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Erik A. Olson (8479)

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN G E E &
LOVELESS

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000

185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee Jacobsen
Construction Company, Inc.

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

Attorneys for Appellants Teton Builders
and Thomas R. Hunter

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT
I.

1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENFORCED JACOBSEN'S
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE THE CLAUSE IS
UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY

1

A. Utah Public Policy Must Be Applied Before the Court Looks to
Wyoming Law

1

B. This Case Should Be Dismissed Based on Utah Public Policy

3

C. Even Wyoming Public Policy Supports the Dismissal of this Case

5

II. EVEN IF JACOBSEN'S FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE WERE
ENFORCEABLE, THERE IS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER
HENDERSON

6

A. Jacobsen Fails to Distinguish Justice Howe's Concurring Opinion in
Henderson

6

B. Even If Henderson Applies to Forum Selection Clauses, This Case
Bears No "Rational Nexus" with Utah

7

1.

A Rational Nexus with Only One Party Is Insufficient Under
Henderson

8

2.

There Is No Rational Nexus in This Case with Both Parties

10

3.

There Is No Rational Nexus Between Utah and the Subject
Matter of This Case

10

Dismissal of This Action Serves Henderson's Policy of
Preserving Judicial Resources

11

4.
CONCLUSION

12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Durdahl v. National Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1999)

2

Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)... 1
Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256

passim

Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1994)

3,4, 5

Resource Technology Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1996)

2

Smithco Eng'g, Inc. v. International Fabricators, Inc., 775 P.2d 1011 (Wyo. 1989)

2

The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)

2

Trillium, U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 101, 37 P.3d 1093

1, 2

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3

3, 5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1(3)

3

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-5-101

4, 5

ii

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENFORCED JACOBSEN'S
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE THE CLAUSE IS
UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
On multiple public policy bases, the trial court abused its discretion when it

enforced the forum selection clause at issue in this case. On any of the alternative
grounds discussed in detail below, this Court should reverse.
A-

Utah Public Policy Must Be Applied Before the Court Looks to
Wyoming Law,

Jacobsen attempts in vain to argue that Utah public policy does not apply in
this action before a Utah court, completely failing to distinguish this Court's declaration
that Utah public policies must be addressed before a Utah court can extend comity to a
foreign state's laws. See Trillium, U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT
101, t 19, 37 P.3d 1093 ("'Of primary importance [to Utah courts] is whether [Utah's]
public policies . . . would be contravened if comity were extended.'") (quoting Jackett v.
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Instead, Jacobsen makes the circular argument that since Wyoming law applies under
Jacobsen's contract, this Court should look exclusively to Wyoming public policy in
determining whether to extend comity to Wyoming law.
Jacobsen's argument should be rejected. Jacobsen is correct that under
Wyoming law, a forum selection clause is generally enforceable so long as it is not
unreasonable or against public policy. However, Jacobsen completely ignores that before

1

a Utah court extends comity to, and applies, the law of Wyoming, the Utah court must
look to Utah's own public policy. This Court so held in Trillium USA, and the Wyoming
Supreme Court so held as well.
The Wyoming court explained in Durdahl, "we will enforce provisions of a
contract between the parties declaring that any disputes will be settled with reference to
the law of a foreign jurisdiction so long as that law is not contrary to Wyoming law,
public policy, or the general interests of Wyoming citizens." Durdahl v. National Safety
Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d 525, 528, 530 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Resource Technology Corp. v.
Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1996)); see also Smithco Eng'g, Inc. v.
International Fabricators, Inc., 775 P.2d 1011,1018 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that Wyoming
court "will not apply foreign law when it is contrary to the law, public policy, or the
general interests of Wyoming's citizens").1 Based on these authorities, Utah public policy
must be applied before the application of Wyoming law.

1

Jacobsen criticizes Subcontractors' citation of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1,15 (1972), which admittedly is not controlling law on the issue of enforcing a forum
selection clause. Jacobsen's Brief at 15 n.7. However, this Court cited The Bremen with
approval in Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Svs., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 811-12 & n.4 (Utah 1994), which
shows that The Bremen is persuasive authority on the issue of whether to enforce a forum
selection clause.
2

B.

This Case Should Be Dismissed Based on Utah Public Policy,

Utah public policies provide a sufficient basis for refusing to enforce the
forum selection clause. First, Utah public policy provides for the litigation of
construction disputes in the state where the construction project is located. See Brief of
Appellant at 9 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2)). This is not a novel concept. Utah's
mechanic's lien statute lends additional support, providing that an action to enforce a
mechanic's lien must be brought in the county where the real property is located. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1(3). Jacobson's claims against Subcontractors—which as
discussed in more detail below have spawned bifurcated litigation in two states—belong
in Teton County, Wyoming, where the construction project and real property at issue in
the case are located.
Second, as this Court recognized in Prows, Utah has a public policy of
avoiding bifurcated litigation. See id. at 10-13. Importantly, it was in Prows that this
Court refused to enforce a forum selection clause based on this public policy. See Prows
v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 812-13 (Utah 1994). Jacobsen attempts to
explain away the bifurcated litigation it has created by suggesting that Jacobsen prevailed
before the Wyoming trial court on its attempt to strike Teton Builders' lien. Jacobsen
conveniently ignores, however, the fact that Teton Builders' appeal of the Wyoming trial
court's order is currently pending before the Wyoming Supreme Court. See Jacobsen's
Brief at Ex. C.

In the event that Teton Builders prevails before the Wyoming Supreme
Court, Teton Builders will be able to proceed with its mechanic's lien foreclosure action,
which can only be brought in Wyoming. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-5-101. Moreover,
based on the alternate security that Jacobsen has posted in Wyoming, Teton Builders' suit
against the owner or the surety for payment on the bond will need to take place in
Wyoming, since Teton Builders cannot obtain jurisdiction over the owner or the surety in
Utah. Teton Builders' claims, defenses, and evidence in that Wyoming action will mirror
what Teton Builders will present before the Utah trial court if the instant case is not
dismissed.
The outcome of Teton Builders' Wyoming appeal is admittedly uncertain.
However, the uncertainty of what the Wyoming Supreme Court will do at some future
time should not preclude this Court from refusing to enforce the forum selection clause as
a matter of Utah public policy. While the opinion was not entirely clear, it appears from
the Court's decision in Prows that a second lawsuit in another forum had not even been
filed but only appeared likely. 868 P.2d at 812-13. Yet, even under those circumstances
where bifurcated litigation was merely a threat, this Court refused to enforce the forum
selection clause. Id.
Likewise, in this case, the Court should refuse to enforce the forum
selection clause because it would be the only sure way to avoid concurrent litigation of
this dispute in two states. The parties then will be able to bring their respective claims in
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one action in Wyoming, which indisputably is the most convenient forum for these
claims. If instead this Court affirms and the trial court retains jurisdiction, the Court risks
that Teton Builders will prevail on its appeal and be faced with bifurcated litigation in
two states, in violation of the public policy espoused in Prows. Dismissal is the only sure
way to avoid such a result and preserve Utah public policy.
C.

Even Wyoming Public Policy Supports the Dismissal of this
Case.

Even if the Court were to look to Wyoming public policy, the Court should
refuse to enforce the forum selection clause. According to Jacobsen, Subcontractors
"have never identified a single public policy of Wyoming" that would preclude
enforcement of the forum selection clause. Jacobsen's Brief at 15. This is not the case.
While Wyoming lacks a statute comparable to Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3,
Wyoming's venue statute, as discussed above, requires lien foreclosure claims to be
brought in the county where the real property at issue is located. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
1-5-101. This statute at minimum expresses Wyoming public policy regarding the venue
for mechanic's lien foreclosure actions. Based on the pending Wyoming appeal relating
to Teton Builders' lien, and the fact that issues in Teton Builders' lien foreclosure action
will mirror the issues that will be litigated in this case, the Court should dismiss based on
Wyoming public policy.

II.

EVEN IF JACOBSEN'S FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE WERE
ENFORCEABLE, THERE IS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
UNDER HENDERSON.
Even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it enforced the

forum selection clause and permitted bifurcated litigation in two states over a Wyoming
construction project, the trial court still erred in exercising jurisdiction under the "rational
nexus" test of Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256. First,
Jacobsen cannot refute that Justice Howe's concurrence expressly limits the reach of
Henderson to cases where there is an express consent-to-jurisdiction provision. Second,
even if Henderson applied to this case, a rational nexus is not created where the only
Utah connection is the domicile of one party. Holding otherwise would allow Utahdomiciled litigants to bring all of their litigation arising in other states into Utah, no
matter how complex the issue, remote the location of the transaction, or unrelated the
action is to Utah. On these bases, the Court should reverse.
A.

Jacobsen Fails to Distinguish Justice Howe's Concurring
Opinion in Henderson.

Jacobsen cannot explain away the fact that Henderson is limited to cases
involving an express consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Jacobsen attempts to hide in the fact
that the lead opinion made no distinction between forum selection clauses and consent-tojurisdiction clauses. Jacobsen's Brief at 24-25. However, the lead opinion's use of the
term "forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause" to describe a provision of the
contract that included both a forum selection clause and a consent-to-jurisdiction clause
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does not change Justice Howe's statement that he was joining in the lead opinion's
"rational nexus" test only with respect to the consent-to-jurisdiction clause, and not with
respect to the forum selection clause. Henderson, 2000 UT 64 at ff 20, 22 (Howe, C.J.,
concurring). And, the lead opinion did not respond to the distinction that Justice Howe
drew between the two clauses, rendering Henderson a plurality opinion as to forum
selection clauses.
Thus, whatever language was used by the lead opinion, Justice Howe's
concurrence limited the majority opinion—and thus the reach of the "rational nexus"
test—to cases where there is a consent-to-jurisdiction clause. As a result, the traditional
minimum contacts analysis governs, and dictates that this case be dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
B.

Even If Henderson Applies to Forum Selection Clauses, This
Case Bears No "Rational Nexus" with Utah,

Even if the Court determined to extend Henderson to this case, it should
still reverse because there is no "rational nexus." Rather than blindly enforce consent-tojurisdiction clauses or forum selection clauses, this Court held in Henderson that such a
clause "by itself is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a
matter of law." 2000 UT 64 at f 14. Thus, even if Henderson applied to the forum
selection clause at issue in this case, there still must be is a "rational nexus" between the
selected forum and "either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the

subject matter of the contract." Henderson, 2000 UT 64 at f 14. Here, there is neither.
The Court should reverse with instructions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
1.

A Rational Nexus with Only One Party Is Insufficient Under
Henderson.

Playing fast and loose with the Court's opinion in Henderson, Jacobsen
improperly suggests that a "rational nexus" only needs to exist with "'either [of] the
parties5" in order for the test to be satisfied. Jacobsen's Brief at 24 (allegedly quoting
Henderson). However, it is Jacobsen—and not this Court—that gratuitously inserts
"[of]" in the quoted language from Henderson. The Court had every opportunity in
Henderson to proclaim that a connection between Utah and one party is sufficient, but
instead chose to base the "rational nexus" test on a Utah connection to "the parties." Id.
at f 15 (emphasis supplied). Thus, under current Utah law, a forum must have a rational
nexus to "the parties"—as opposed to merely the plaintiff—or to the subject matter of the
litigation. Id.
Attempting to rewrite Henderson, Jacobsen suggests that the mere Utah
residence of a plaintiff satisfies the rational nexus test. However, Jacobsen does not
refute that a rational nexus existed in Henderson based on (1) a connection between Utah
and the subject matter of the action, as well as (2) both parties to the litigation. Id. at f
16. There, PDC, the plaintiff, was a Utah corporation with its principal place of business
in Utah. Id at ^f 3. The defendant, a California resident, also had a Utah connection. IcL
atfflf4-7. He called Utah to speak to PDC's CEO regarding employment, subsequently
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came to Utah to discuss employment, called Utah headquarters to negotiate the terms of
his contract, and finally, signed his contract and returned it to Utah. Id at ff 5-7.
Clearly, both parties had an established, rational connection to Utah. Additionally, this
created a sufficient rational nexus between Utah and the contract, the subject matter of
the litigation. See id. at f 16. Had the mere residence of PDC in Utah been sufficient to
satisfy the rational nexus test, the Court could have disposed of its analysis of the
defendant's connection to Utah. Thus, applying Henderson's facts and plain language, a
connection between both parties and Utah is necessary.
Jacobsen's other remaining argument is that if Henderson required a
rational nexus with both parties—which it does require—the Henderson opinion would
add nothing to Utah law because jurisdiction would be found under the traditional
minimum contacts analysis. This argument makes no sense, and improperly conflates
Henderson's rational nexus test with the traditional minimum contacts analysis.
The Court was careful in Henderson to distinguish between the rational
nexus test and the traditional minimum contacts analysis, explaining, "Although the
rational nexus element does require some connection between Utah and either the parties
to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it need not rise to the level required under
section 78-27-24." 2000 UT 64 at \ 14. The Court then held that although the defendant
had insufficient minimum contacts with Utah on which to exercise personal jurisdiction,
there was a sufficient rational nexus between both parties and Utah. Thus, Henderson
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was precisely a case in which there was a rational nexus but there were insufficient
minimum contacts. Here, in contrast, there is neither a rational nexus nor the requisite
minimum contacts, and thus no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction.
2.

There Is No Rational Nexus in This Case with Both Parties.

Jacobsen does not dispute that unlike Henderson, where concurring Justices
wrestled with whether the defendant's contacts were sufficient to meet the minimum
contacts analysis, Jacobsen is the only party to the present case with a Utah connection.
See id. at ^ 23-28 (Wilkins, J., joined by Russon, A.C.J., concurring on the ground that
defendant possessed requisite minimum contacts with Utah). Jacobsen is domiciled here,
but Subcontractors have absolutely no connection to Utah. Subcontractors have never
worked, advertised, contracted, or conducted any nature of business in this state. See
Hunter Aff. at Tflf 5-9. [R.37.] Additionally, it did not have to make any contacts with
Utah in order to enter into the contract at issue. See id. at ^fl[ 11-12, 14, 16-17. [R.3738.] Based on Subcontractors' complete lack of contacts with Utah, there can be no
rational nexus between Utah and "the parties" to the litigation, as Henderson requires.
2000 UT 64 at % 15.
3.

There Is No Rational Nexus Between Utah and the Subject
Matter of This Case.

Likewise, Jacobsen does not deny that there is no rational nexus between
Utah and the subject matter of this litigation. The contract was negotiated and signed in
Wyoming, the performance of the contract was to take place entirely within Wyoming,
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the construction site is in Wyoming, and the alleged breaches took place in Wyoming.
See Hunter Aff. atffif10-12, 16-18, 19-21. [R.37-39.] Thus, there is no rational nexus
between Utah and the subject matter of the litigation, and the Henderson test is not
satisfied.
4.

Dismissal of This Action Serves Henderson's Policy of
Preserving Judicial Resources.

Utah's policy of preserving judicial resources is served by the dismissal of
this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Henderson, 2000 UT 64 at ^f 15 (holding
that the rational nexus test addresses "[t]he potential risks of expanded jurisdiction—
particularly the waste of judicial resources"). Henderson expresses the policy of devoting
this state's resources to resolving disputes that have some relationship to Utah, rather
than taxing Utah's judicial system with cases that have no Utah connection. Allowing
the mere domicile of one party to pass the rational nexus test would defeat this policy,
opening Utah's courts to cases—such as the present case—that involve entirely foreign
defendants, foreign transactions, foreign real property, foreign construction projects, and
even the application of foreign law. The Court should avoid such undue financial and
time constraints on the Utah court system and reverse the trial court based on the failure
to satisfy the rational nexus test.

2

Jacobsen's brief states that Subcontractors walked off the job before completing their
work. Jacobsen's Brief at 16. However, Jacobsen's allegation will not be decided until a trial,
and as such, it should not be considered.
11

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in their opening brief, Subcontractors
Teton Builders and Thomas R. Hunter respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial
court's order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand
to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
DATED this ^

day of June, 2004.
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